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apparent paradox in Michel Foucault's attitude toward henneneutics. Although critical of its goal and method, he exemplifies at its best
the qualities of a rigorous interpreter who tries to separate his own descriptive discourse from the object he describes, whether in his powerful descriptions of
some periods of Westem culture or in his painstaking interpretation of Hellenistic
philosophy or little known treatises of the seventeenth century. The paradox is further reinforced when Foucault engages in his last years in what he himself calls a
"henneneutics of the subject." Nevertheless, Foucault's views on henneneutics can
be organized along three perspectives: (I) in The Order of Things, hermeneutics is
presented as a kind of discourse that can be dated in its arising and thereby relativized in any universal claim it can make; (2) in Archaeology of KnrtWiedge, henneneutics
is mentioned as a method of investigation that archaeology criticizes and claims
to overcome; and (3) in some of his last works henneneutics is co-opted as a new
approach to the self, for example in The Hermeneutics of the Subject. Let us therefore
examine each of these three perspectives.
In The Order ofThings, Foucault uses the word "hermeneutics" in two different
senses. He characterizes the age of the Renaissance as the age of henneneutics and
describes the new discipline of henneneutics in the nineteenth century as a fonn of
compensation to the treatment of language as an autonomous object. Regarding the
Renaissance, Foucault argues that in the sixteenth century the prominent role played
by similitude in order to make sense of the world was made possible by the combination of henneneutics and semiology. By henneneutics Foucault means "the totality
of the leaming and skills that enable one to make the signs speak and to discover
their meaning" (Ear, 29). These two aspects ofhenneneutics and semiology in fact
represent what will become the discipline of hermeneutics in the nineteenth century.
Without detailed descriptions, for example of its origin in Ast and Schleiennacher
and further development with Dilthey, Foucault only mentions hermeneutics under
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the name of "exegesis," as a discipline that arose when people like Raynouard, Bopp,
or the Grimm brothers focused on the organic unity of specific natural languages
and turned these languages into new "natural" objects of scientific investigations in
philology or linguistics. The treaonent of language as a mere object of investigation
caused what Foucault calls a compensation in the form of a "formalization," which
started to find application in the human sciences; of a "literature," which became a
particular use of language that resists theory; and of "exegesis." Exegesis or hermeneutics experienced a renewal of interest owing to the fact that languages are not
only organic unities but are also embedded in a traditio n and have acquired in the
course of time layers of social and cultural influences that can be "interpreted."
In the second perspective we mentioned, that of The Archaeology of Knowledge,
Foucault takes issue with the very method of hermeneutics rather than examining it
as a historical discipline as he did earlier. By tracing the genealogy of hermeneutics
in a diachronic perspective in The Order of Things, Foucault already contextualized
the "rigor" and "principles" of the discipline and showed that the so-called discipline of hermeneutics was rather an effect of the disappearance of discourse as it was
prominent in the classical age. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault mounts a
full-fledged attack on the hermeneutic method in order to present his own archaeology. Hermeneutics anempts to go hack to the arising of meaning and to locate it as a
psychological moment, even if unconscious, that is manifested by autonomous signs.
In contrast, archaeology "refuses to be allegorical" (EAK, 1 39). Instead of being "an
interpretive-discipline" that seeks "another, bener-hidden discourse" (ibid.), archaeology treats meaning as an event that can be described in its conditions of possibility
irrespective of what speakers or agents intended or meant. Since signs are treated in
their materiality, archaeology does not have to abide by the boundaries of works or
the self-identity of inten tions. In its comparison between works of biology and works
of philology without following what "authors" may have meant, archaeology renders
irrelevant any effort to recover an author's meaning, to understand authors bener or
differently than they understood themselves, as hermeneutics of Scheiermacher's or
Gadamer's provenance typically does. Because archaeology deals with the materiality of sources and is commined to "the intrinsic description of monuments" (EAK,
7), its description is "purged of all anthropologism" (EAK, 16). This also means that
signs are bound to their historical conditions and do not exert their semiotic function across centuries.
This focus on the material and historical conditions of knowledge allows the
archaeological description to escape the tyranny of both the propositional level of
thought and the ontological nature of things. Regarding the propositional level,
Foucault argues that what he calls "statement" allows him to reach the level of
what is an "event" that "neither the language [langue] nor the meaning can quite
exhaust" (EAR, 28). The regularities that archaeology describes among statements
or between statements and objects lead to "discursive formations" that generate, in
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the mathematical sense of a matrix, intentions and meanings. Human beings themselves are shaped by these discursive fonnations and thus not in charge or in possession of such formations. Regarding the ontological nature of things, archaeology
brings to the fore a level of sense that escapes the level of things or, in Foucault's
tenns, that can "dispense" with them (EAK, 47). Despite the apparent stability of
things like metallic pins, the analysis of discursive fonnations can show that a pin
manufactured in the classical age by a single worker in eighteen operations (EOT,
224) and the apparently same pin later on manufactured on an industrial scale rely
on two different discursive fonnations. Because they have different material and historical conditions of possibility, they do not belong to the same "order" of things and
thus, strictly speaking, are not the "same" thing.
The claim that archaeology reaches a level that is below subjectivity and below
things, as well as the hope to escape henneneutics, runs against the significant limitations of the results archaeology can show. Although Foucault clearly does not want
to describe what he calls "the spirit or science of a period," his "positivistic" anirude
of description is compromised by the "henneneutic" decisions he made in choosing
his own fields of investigation in The Order of Things. He himself wholeheartedly
acknowledges that, had he chosen other fields, the results may have been different.
He even accepts the objection he himself raises: "Could not pre-Lavoisier chemistry,
or Euler's mathematics, or Vico's history have invalidated all the analyses to be found
in The OrdN' of Things" (EAK, I58)? Foucault grants that his analyses are limited
because he wanted to focus on "one region of interpositivity" (EAK, 159); for example, showing that the classification of living entities in eighteenth-century narural
history was made according to the same rules of representation as those enunciated
by general grammar, so that natural history in fact used a grammar of classification
analogous to general grammar. To require that his limited analysis be corroborated
by other fields of investigation would be, he argues, to require that he describe a
Weltanschauung, precisely what he rejects: "The horizon of archaeology, therefore,
is not a science, a rationality, a mentality, a culture; it is a tangle of interpositivities
whose limits and points of intersection cannot be fixed in a single operation" (EAK,
159, Foucault's italics). The goal, Foucault says, is not to offer a unity of the objects
of investigation but to celebrate their diversity by identifying several configurations.
Therefore, he says that "Archaeological comparison does not have a unifying, but a
diversifying, effect" (EAK, 160).
If the results of archaeology are only valid for the fields chosen by the archaeological method and cannot be extended to other fields and thus cannot be submitted
to the scrutiny of other disciplines, it seems that archaeology is ill named, for the
way the investigation is presented in The Order ofThings, at the very least, suggests a
kind of rigorous historical investigation that can respond to objections and counterexamples even if these come from fields other than those Foucault examined. If now,
as Foucault acknowledges in The Archaeology of Knowledge, the results are only valid
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for the fields investigated and no generalizations should be made to other fields,
we in fact have to deal more with the genealogy of a discipline, like economy, biology, or linguistics, than with a systematic study of regularities leading to discursive
formations. Equally misused is the term "quasi-transcendentals," by which Foucault
characterizes "Life, Labour, and Language" and uses as an alternative to "the transcendental field of subjectivity" (Ear, 250).
It may be this drastic limitation of the claims of archaeology th.a t led to a change
of focus in Foucault's works toward a genealogy - and with the paradox that genealogy can better and more successfully accommodate the hermeneutic method that
the archaeology rejected. Foucault uses the genealogical method on a variety of topics, like the prison system and the techniques to shape and mold the individual, but
came to find its unifying theme in what he calls the "care" or "practice of the se)f'
and can be seen retrospectively as being already at work in the previous studies,
although in an inverted form. To the outside structures and institutions rendering
the self docile, there also corresponds a self that forms itself through these institutions and through the experiences made possible by such institutions. "The care of
the self" was the title of the third volume of the History of Sexuality, and the term
"hermeneutics" was used in the title of one of Foucault's last courses at the College
de France, "The Hermeneutics of the Subject." So, we come to the third perspective
we outlined.
The hermeneutics of the self is not an investigation of the essence of subjectivity or a IilstOry of the subject in Western thought. Instead of an epistemological
approach that would put Socrates' gnoti seauton in continuation with Descartes' cogito
sum, Foucault's specific and idiosyncratic hermeneutics focuses on the experience
of the self: the self sees itself, experiences itself, and forms itself. In such a view of
the self as a practice, the world and others are part of an experience within which a
self comes to form itself. Foucault's hermeneutics functions below the level of what
could be a stable structure of the self, a substance or an essence of selfhood. The goal
is not to "interpret" the self but to accompany its disclosure to itself, as it were, by
following the experiences through which a self comes to understand itself or manifest itself. This is more a "hermeneutic attitude" than a hermeneutic method, and it
allows Foucault to revisit such notions as askesis or parresia in the Stoics in order to
show that they are in fact "practices of the self." P01resia, for example, is an exercise
in truth-telling or being true to oneself. This experience of the truth or this relation
between subject and truth makes it clear that the self does not lie in anything that is
stable or fixed under the level of experience but rather consists in a set of experiences
and as such in a practice.
The hermeneutics of the subject provides a method of investigation that deals
with "objects" other than in archaeology in the sense that the experience of the
self is different from the discursive formation at the basis of what we call "man."
Besides disrupting the common views on the self that either the self only arose with
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modernity or that there is a continuity between Socrates and Descartes, Foucault's
hermeneutics also tempers his own pronouncements in The Ord." ofThings that "man
will return to that serene non-existence in which he was formerly maintained by the
imperious unity of discourse" (EOT, 386). The notion of practice of the self thus not
only offers an alternative to any traditional metaphysics of the self. It also mitigates
Foucault's own views: his apocalyptical breaks between epistNnes taking place outside the experience of the self (in his archaeological period) as well as his focus on
structures of power that subdue the subject outside its experience. In Foucault's later
work, hermeneutics recovers its original humility of being an adjuvant to something
that shows itself or somebody who attests to his or her own self.
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